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AGAIN THE LAST CLEAR CHANCE DOCTRINE
Excluding the obvious case of negligent conduct on the defendant's
part followed by the plaintiff's later act of negligence (as where a
plaintiff "riding very hard" at dusk negligently ran into and was
injured by a pole which the defendant had negligently left in the
highway)' the cases that come within the doctrines of "contributory
negligence" and "last clear chance" fall naturally into four classes.
(I) The plaintiff by his negligence has placed himself (or his
property) 1 in a position of helpless peril from which in all likelihood
'Butterfield v. Forrester (i8og) ii East, 6o "If [the plaintiff] had used
ordinary care, he must have seen the obstruction; so that the accident appeared
to happen entirely from his own fault." Per Bayley, J.
2 These rules apply, apparently with equal force, to injuries to property as
well as to personal injuries. In fact the parent case on the subject, Davies v.
Mfann (i842) IO M. & W. 546, involved the death of the plaintiff's donkey.
For the sake of simplicity the propositions as stated cover only personal injuries,
although a few of the cases cited in the following notes involved injuries to
personal property.
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he cannot even at the last moment extricate himself. The defendant
has notice of such peril in time, by the exercise of care, to avoid
injury to the plaintiff. Here it is well settled that the defendant's
negligent failure to use care to avoid the collision makes him answer-
able in damages for the ensuing harm suffered by the plaintiff.3
(2) The plaintiff could by the use of care remove himself from the
position of peril in which he has negligently placed himself, but he
(negligently) remains unconscious of his peril. The defendant has
notice of the plaintiff's peril and of the plaintiff's unconsciousness
thereof in time, by the use of care on his (defendant's) part, to avoid
the injury to the plaintiff. Here it is generally agreed that the defend-
ant's failure to use care to avoid the collision makes him chargeable
for the plaintiff's harm.4
(3) The plaintiff as in the first class has negligently placed himself
in a position of helpless peril from which he probably cannot even at
the last moment extricate himself. The defendant is not aware of
plaintiff's peril, yet by using due care he could have discovered it in
time to enable him, by the use of care, to avoid the injury to the
plaintiff. Here the great weight of authority allows a recovery by
the plaintiff.5
(4) The plaintiff as in the second class has by his negligence placed
himself in a position of peril, from which, however, he could by the
'This proposition is now unquestioned. Many of the authorities are collected
in i Shearman & Redfield, Negligence (6th ed. 1913) sec. 99, note 248.
""The conclusion that one conscious of danger of serious injury to a human
being if he persists in the course which he is pursuing, which he can prevent
by care, should be discharged from responsibility because of negligent ignorance
of the danger in the person injured, is so fundamentally unjust and contrary
to natural reason that few cases are to be found that carry the logic of the
rule of contributory negligence to that extent. With substantial unanimity,
recovery is permitted in such cases, either upon the ground that the lack of
attention in the party injured is not the proximate cause of the injury, or that
the failure of the trainmen to act under such circumstances so far partakes
of the nature of a wanton or intentional wrong that the law as to con-
tributory negligence has no application. . . . It may be that neither explana-
tion is strictly logical, and that the real foundation for the rule is merely its
fundamental justice and reasonableness." Cavanaugh v. Boston & Maine R. R.
(1911) 76 N. H. 68, 72, 79 Atl. 694, 696. See also Gunter's Adrn'r v. Southern Ry.
(1920, Va.) lol S. E. 885, 894, (192o) 29 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 697.
'Teakle v. San Pedro etc. R. R. (1907) 32 Utah, 276, 9o Pac. 402; Nicol v.
Oregon, Washington R. & Nay. Co. (1912) 71 Wash. 409, 128 Pac. 628; contra,
Bourrett v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. (1911) 152 Iowa, 579, 132 N. W. 973. See
also Starck vn. Pacific Electric Ry. (1916) 172 Calif. 277, 156 Pac. 51. Of
course there must be a duty resting on the plaintiff to use care to discover the
plaintiff's presence. See Teakle v. San Pedro, etc., R. R., supra. Some of the
decisions denying a recovery can be explained on the ground that the plaintiff
was a trespasser to whom no such duty was owing. The same explanation is
applicable also to cases where a railroad train has run into trespassing cattle.
See 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 957, note.
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use of care at the last moment extricate himself. The defendant, had
he used care, could have discovered the plaintiff's peril and could have
avoided the ensuing injury to him. Here almost all courts deny a
recovery." Missouri and perhaps a few other jurisdictions allow a
recovery under what is called the "humanity doctrine."
7
It is obvious that in the cases belonging to the first of the four
classes here enumerated the defendant, and the defendant only, had the
last clear chance to avoid the harm which the plaintiff has suffered.
In the second class it is in a sense correct to say that the defendant
alone had the last clear chance, since in the form in which the situation
is presented to the defendant, it must necessarily be clear to him that
he alone can avoid the collision." In the third class it is plain that the
defendant alone had the last clear chance, although he was not aware
of it. In the fourth class it is equally plain that neither party had
the sole last chance of avoiding the harm to plaintiff, because by
hypothesis if either of them had used care at the last moment the
harm to the plaintiff would not have occurred.
Testing the several situations by the doctrine of proximate cause,'
which is the test usually applied in the decisions, it is evident that as
between the parties the defendant's negligence was the more proximate
cause and the plaintiff's a relatively more remote cause in the first
three classes; whereas in the last class, the negligence of the defendant
and that of the plaintiff being concurrent, each necessarily contributed
as one of the several proximate causes of the injury.
Viewing the four situations in the light of the rule of policy that a
person should not be permitted to recover damages for the conse-
quences of his own negligence (either because wrongdoers should
have no standing in court with respect to the results of their own
'Dyerson v. Union Pac. R. R. (19o6) 74 Kan. 528, 87 Pac. 680, 7 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 133, with valuable note; Wilson v. Illinois Central R. R. (19II) 15o
Iowa 33, 129 N. W. 340; Wabash Ry. v. Tippecanoe Loan & Trust Co. (1912)
178 Ind. 113, 98 N. E. 64.
'Taylor v. Metropolitan Street Ry. (1914) 256 Mo. 191, x65 S. W. 327. The
statutory rule which prevails in some states as to comparative negligence where
a person is run down by a railroad train, would often allow a recovery in a
case falling under class four. See note 12, infra.
'This point is clearly brought out in 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 132, 139 note.
'It should be noted that the term proximate cause is given a somewhat nar-
rower meaning than usual in cases between a negligent plaintiff and a negligent
defendant. Had a non-negligent stranger X been injured by the collision in
any of the four cases above enumerated, X could doubtless maintain action
against either of the two negligent parties. Lane v. Atlantic Works (1872)
iii Mass. 136. Professor Bohlen has pointed out that at the time the earliest
cases of contributory negligence were decided the earlier of the two wrong-
doers would have been excused from responsibility to X on the ground that
there had intervened the wrongftil conduct of another human being, as in Vicars
v. Wilcocks (i8o6) 8 East, i. See Bohlen, Contributory Negligence (198o) 21
HARV. L. REV. 233, 236.
COMMENTS
wrongdoing,10 or because of a belief that to impose such a prohibition
will result in a more complete observance of a high standard of care
by members of the community generally)- t first glance it would
seem that a recovery should be denied to the plaintiff under all of the
above circumstances. *Yet this policy must in certain circumstances
yield to the more important policy of safeguarding life and limb, as
well as valuable property. Hence in the first and second classes and
probably in the third class, sound public policy would appear to justify
a recovery of damages by the plaintiff.
As to the fourth class it is not easy to decide which of the two rules
of policy should prevail. Indeed we are here confronted with the
inherent weakness of the whole doctrine of contributory negligence,
namely, that the common law makes no effort to apportion the blame
or even to divide the loss between two parties who are guilty of con-
current negligence. Seemingly the now discarded doctrine of com-
parative negligence which once prevailed in Illinois,' 2 as well as the
many provisions to the same effect found in our recent workmen's
compensation acts and employers' liability acts, are attempts to mitigate
the harshness of the common-law doctrine which holds that a plaintiff
whose negligence has at the last moment concurred with defendant's
negligence in producing the injury, shall be precluded from obtaining
from the defendant any compensation whatever, irrespective of the
relative fault of the two parties and of the relative loss suffered by the
two in consequence of their concurrent negligence. The hardship
worked by the common-law rule upon a plaintiff seems particularly
glaring where the defendant is negligent in the operation of a machine
which is capable of doing great harm if mismanaged, such as a loco-
motive, a train, a street car, or an automobile, and it is with respect to
such situations that we find the occasional decisions which have broken
away from the general rule of contributory negligence. Even though
the last chance to avoid the harm may have been as much within the
plaintiff's control as within the defendant's, yet the dictates of human-
ity are said to impose responsibility for the plaintiff's harm upon the
offending operator of the dangerous machine. However faulty may
be the logic of these decisions, and obviously they lean too far in the
plaintiff's favor even as the more general rule may be thought to go
too far in the defendant's favor, they have the support of whatever
analogy may be found in the statutes above referred to, which are
10See Davis v. Guarnieri (1887) 45 Oh. St. 470, 479; Schofield, Theory of
Contributory Negligence (189o) 3 HARV. L. REV. 263, 268-270; Bohlen,
op. cit., 256.
11 Ibid.
"Galena & C. U. R. R. v. Jacobs (1858) 20 Ill. 478. The doctrine of
comparative negligence has been established by statute, so far as concerns
actions against railroads, in Florida, Georgia, and Wisconsin. See (1911)
9 MicH. L. REv. 444.
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designed to protect an employee against damage suffered in the course
of a more or less hazardous employment.
An interesting variation upon the humanity doctrine is announced
by the recent Connecticut decision of Tullock v. Connecticut Com-
pany13 where the court held the defendant liable for the negligence
of its employees in failing to discover the plaintiff's intestate upon its
track, although such intestate could up to the last moment have
saved himself from harm by simply stepping off the track. The court
in so deciding approved the distinction laid down by way of dictum
in the case of Nehring v. Connecticut Company14 that where the plain-
tiff has negligently placed himself in a position of peril, the means of
escape being open to him by the exercise of reasonable care, the
defendant is responsible for negligently failing to discover the plaintiff
in time to avoid doing him harm, provided the plaintiff remained
passive in his position of peril; but that if the plaintiff had continued as
an active agent in producing the circumstances under which his injury
was received down to the time of its occurrence, or at least until it
was too late for the defendant, had he known of the plaintiff's peril,
to have saved him, then the plaintiff's conduct is to be deemed a part
of the efficient cause of his injury and bars his recovery.
This view seeks to subdivide the fourth class of cases in the fore-
going enumeration, holding the defendant responsible for a negligent
failure to discover the plaintiff's position of peril even though the
plaintiff at the last moment could have escaped therefrom, provided
the plaintiff remained passive, but denying a recovery where the plain-
tiff's active negligence continued up to the last moment. 15
Further experience alone can tell whether this distinction can be
maintained as a practical working rule. It is believed that the under-
lying reason for it is an endeavor to give some relief to a plaintiff who
is negligent at the last moment, without going the full length of the
Missouri doctrine. In short it is another one of the many attempts
which are being made to reach a fair compromise in cases of contribu-
tory negligence.16
(1920, Conn.) io8 Atl. 556.
" (1912) 89 Conn. iog, 84 Alt. 301, 45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 896. It should be noted
that in the Nehring case there was a vigorous dissenting opinion in favor of
allowing a recovery whether the plaintiff's conduct at the last moment was active
or passive.
" Perhaps the recent English decision of Ellerman Lines, Ltd. v. H. & G.
Grayson (i919, C. A.) 121 L. T. R. 5o8, discussed in (1920) 29 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 542, 580, may be explained on this distinction between active and
passive negligence on plaintiff's part.
'The provision of the Constitution of Oklahoma that the defence of contribu-
tory negligence "shall in all cases whatsoever be a question of fact and shall at
all times be left to the jury" (art. 23, sec. 6) doubtless operates to enable a plain,-
tiff to recover for a defendant's negligence despite the plaintiff's own concurrent
negligence.
COMMENTS
It is a matter of regret that the limitations of our system of trial
by jury prohibit, or are considered to prohibit, an investigation into
the relative fault of the plaintiff and of the defendant, and also into
the relative harm suffered by each. The rule applied in courts of
admiralty'1 and in the civil courts of France,s Germany, 9 and some
other European countries, reaches certainly a more satisfactory result
than we generally do under our common-law rules as to contributory
negligence and last clear chance.
E. S. T.
INJURY BY THE VOLUNTARY ACT OF A STRANGER UNDER THE WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION ACTS
The case of Mfunro v. Williams (1920, Conn.) io9 Atl. 129, re-
cently decided by the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors illustrates
the use of fiction' to arrive at a commendable result under the Work-
men's Compensation law, with the consequent obscuring of the true
effect of the decision in extending the law. In that case, the claim-
ant was the caretaker of his employer's grounds, his duties including
the ordinary repair of structures on the grounds and the protection
of property generally. There were some mischievous youths in the
neighborhood shooting air rifles who, spotting him at work laying a
brick walk in front of a building in which there were windows on all
sides, shot in his general direction in order to get him to run after
them. After duly driving them away as was his duty to protect the
glass, he resumed his work on the walk. The boys, however, soon
returned and again fired, striking him in the eye. The court awarded
compensation, holding that "the claimant on the resumption of his
former work, laying the walk, was still acting in his capacity as
guardian against intruders and trespassers and as general protector
of the property, differing in this respect from the ordinary employee
engaged simply to lay brick." It seems clear that the true effect of
the decision is to award compensation to an employee for an injury
received from the mischievous conduct of a stranger, merely because
such an injury is incidental to another duty of that employee, in which
he was not engaged at the time of the injury.2 But it is ordinarily
'The Max Morris (189o) 137 U. S. I. ii Sup. Ct. 9; The Lackawanna
(19o7, S. D. N. Y.) 151 Fed. 499.
"2 Planiol, Traitj Elimentaire de Droit Civil (6th ed. 1911) sec. 899.
" German Civil Code, sec. 254.
'For the use of fiction generally, see Smith, Surviving Fictions (1917) 27
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 147, 317.
'The court stresses the duty to drive the boys away; not the fact that he had
already once chased them. The indication is strong that recovery would have
been permitted even though he was struck by the very first shot.
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the work in which the employee is engaged at the time of injury that
determines whether or not the injury arises out of the employment. 3
It is beyond question that such an injury would be compensable
if sustained by the employee while actually engaged in defending his
employer's property; and this is true, even though it were not among
his enumerated duties.4 In cases arising out of assault by strangers.
this being a risk to which every one in the community is exposed and
from an agency which bears no relation to the employment and over
which the employer has no control, the controlling factor in awarding
compensation is special exposure to such risk.5 This factor supplies
the causal connection 6 which is necessary to satisfy the requirement
of the vast majority of the Workmen's Compensation Acts that the
injury arise "out of the employment." Such special exposure exists
in any case where the nature of the employment necessitates contact
with strangers who are seeking to commit assault or with strangers
of questionable character generally. And so compensation has been
awarded to a watchman,7 a policeman,s a bartender,9 a collector, 0 and
a conductor 1 or other employee 12 who is made a prey to thieves by
the possession of valuables belonging to the employer. Also where
the employee, whatever his regular duties, is ordered specifically to
'Although the time between the act of driving the boys away and the accident
appears to have been short, this fact was not relied upon by the court; the
whole tenor of the opinion is to make liability depend upon the nature of the
duties placed upon the claimant rather than upon what he was doing at the time.
'Baum v. Industrial Commission (1919) 288 I1l. 516, 123 N. E. 625.
51 Honnold, Workmen's Compensation (1917) 421; State v. District Court
(igi8) I4O Minn. 470, 168 N. W. 55.
'McNicol's Case (1913) 215 Mass. 497, 102 N. E. 697, is the leading case on
the meaning of the phrase "out of the employment."
'Ohio Building Safety Vault Co. v. Industrial Board (1917) 277 Ill. 96, 115
N. E. 149. Engles Copper Mining Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission
(1919, Calif.) 185 Pac. 182. Western Metal Supply Co. v. Pillsbury (1916) 172
Calif. 407, 15 Pac. 491; but not where the assault is personal. Walther v.
American Paper Co. (1916) 89 N. J. Law 732, 99 Atl. 263, (1917) 26 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 621.
' Village of West Salem v. Industrial Commission (i916) 162 Wis. 57, 155
N. W. 929. No recovery allowed in Helburg v. Town of Louisville (1919,
Colo.) i8o Pac. 751, because of a limitation in the Act which excluded injuries
intentionally inflicted by a third party.
'State v. District Court (1916) 134 Minn. 16, 158 N. W. 713; Emerick v.
Slavonian Roman Catholic Union (ii, Sup. Ct. N. J.) 1O8 Atl. 223.
"Schmoll v. Wgeisbrod & Hess Brewing Co. (1916, Sup. Ct.) 89 N. J. Law,
15o, 97 Atl. 723. Compensation was erroneously denied because the employer
had no knowledge. This search for fault is a survival of the common-law
theory of liability in a field where the common-law theory was sought to be
changed. See (1917) 26 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 507; also COMMENT (1920) 29
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 669, 672.
i i N. C. C. A. 251. 'Nisbet v. Rayne & Burn [191o] 2 K. B. 689.
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reclaim stolen property13 or to eject strangers. 4 It is a peril, in such
cases, attached to the particular job.
The injury in the principal case from the standpoint of the ordinary
employee engaged to lay brick merely, must be considered as one
resulting from a peril attached to the particular location in which the
employee was by his employment required to be. It was early held
in England that "it is not enough for the applicant to say 'the acci-
dent would not have happened if I had not been . . . in that particular
place.' "1 But recovery is allowed where the particular locality is
specially exposed to the risks of commonalty. And so in the cases
of injury from the elemental forces of nature'8 and weather condi-
tions, 17 recovery is predicated upon a finding of fact showing a greater
degree of risk. In such cases, it would seem that the employer has
not provided a safe place to work.
At common law, the duty rested upon the master to provide a place
reasonably safe for the doing of the work required of the servant.'3
According to common-law principles, this duty was predicated upon
fault and whittled away by the assumption of risk. It was only when
the master knew of the conditions which made the place unsafe, either
actually or constructively, that the duty to respond in damages for
injuries resulting therefrom attached.'9 And even though he knew, it
was only when the servant did not know, else the servant assumed the
risk.20  The compensation laws have totally eliminated both of these
prerequisities to the employer's duty to pay damages. Fault2' and con-
" Nevich v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. (1917, C. A.) go N. J. Law, 228, 100
Atl. 234.
"Reithel's Case (1915) 222 Mass. 163, iog N. E. 951.
" Craske v. Wicjau (C. A.) [19o9] 2 K. B. 635.
"In the lightning cases, the conflict in the decisions arises from the application
of the same rule to the particular facts in each case. Recovery allowed: Andrew
v. Failsworth Ind. Soc. (C. A.) [19o4] 2 K. B. 32; State v. District Court (1915)
129 Minn. 502, 153 N. W. iig; Moore v. Lehigh Valley R. Co. (1915) 169 App.
Div. 177, 154 N. Y. Supp. 62o. Recovery denied: Hoenig v. Industrial Commis-
sio; (1915) 159 Wis. 646, 15o N. W. 996; Klawinski v. Lake Shore & Michigan
Southern Ry. Co. (1915) 185 Mich. 643, 152 N. W. 213. See Griffith v. Cole Bros.
(1917) 183 Iowa, 415, 165 N. W. 577, where the cases are reversed and compensa-
tion erroneously denied because no violation of duty on the part of the employee
could be found; cf. note IO, supra. Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. Indus-
trial Commission (1920, Ill.) 126 N. E. 144 (injury from tornado).
" Freezing: Larke v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co. (1916) 90 Conn. 303, 97
Atl. 320; McManaman's Case (igi6) 224 Mass. 554, 113 N. E. 287. Sunstroke:
Ahearn v. Spier (igi8) 93 Conn. I51, 1O5 Atl. 340; (1916) 26 YAe LAw
JOURNAL, 76.
" Bailey, Personal Injuries relating to Master and Servant (1897) sec. 2895.
" 3 Labatt, Master and Servant (1913) 2398.
Ibid.
"Swayze, The Growing Law (915) 25 YALE LAW JOURNAL, I; Industrial
Commission v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1918, Colo.) 174 Pac. 589.
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sequently knowledge should be unnecessary and the fact that the
employee knew of the dangerous condition no longer makes him a
willing victim. In the principal case, it appears that the particular
position in which the employee was required by his employment to be,
was unsafe in so far as it exposed him as a target to the neighborhood
boys. Had the employer known of this situation, it is undoubted law
that recovery could be had as for injury arising out of the conditions
under which the employee was required to work22 -because the em-
ployer had not furnished a safe place to work. The risk is none the
less real nor the position more safe for the employee because the em-
ployer did not know. It is submitted that, fault being eliminated,
recovery in the principal case can be sustained as for an injury re-
sulting from a risk attached to the particular location where the em-
ployee was required to be which made that location unsafe, even though
the agency causing the harm was not under the control of the
employer.
23
THE NEW YORK PRACTICE ACT
For some years past, a movement has been in progress looking to a
reform in the civil procedure in the courts of the State of New York.
The simple Code of Procedure drawn by David Dudley Field, and
adopted in 1848, which furnished a model for almost all of the other
states of the Union, had grown to such dimensions as to constitute
a voluminous, intricate and inelastic system of civil practice in our
courts, which involved great expense to litigants, and too frequently
led to the merits of the controversies being entirely obscured by
questions of mere procedure. Some twenty years ago, the Committee
on Law Reform of the New York State Bar Association recommended
the repeal of the Code of Civil Procedure, and in its place the adoption
of a simple practice act containing the more important provisions of
the existing code, rearranged and revised, and supplemented by rules
of court. Similar recommendations were made by other bodies, and
in 1904, the Board of Statutory Consolidation was created by the
Legislature, and authorized, not only to consolidate the general
statutes of the state, but to revise the practice in the courts. Pur-
suant to this act and to supplementary acts oJ the legislature, which, in
'McNicol's Case (1913) 215 Mass. 497, 102 N. E. 697; Schmoll v. Weisbrod
& Hess Brewing Co. (1916) 89 N. J. L. 150, 97 Atl. 723.
. This position is supported by both English and American authority. Thorn
v. Sinclair [1917] A. C. 127, 116 L. T. 6og; Kimbal v. Industrial Accident
Commission (1916) 173 Calif. 351, 16o Pac. 15o. The vigorous dissenting opinion
in the California case shows the difficulty of judges trained in common-law
principles of liability to enforce a duty to pay when there is no fault. There is,
however, authority contra: Cennel v. Daniels Co. (1918) 203 Mich. 73, 168
N. W. OO9.
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1913, specifically directed the Board to prepare and present to the
legislature a practice act, rules of court, and short forms, the Board
of Statutory Consolidation, in 1915, submitted to the legislature a
proposed simple civil practice act and rules of court, designed to
simplify the practice in the courts of the state. In the same year,
the Constitutional Convention, then sitting, adopted as a part of the
revised state constitution recommended by it, a provision making it
the duty of the legislature to act upon that report with all convenient
speed, to enact a brief and simple civil practice act, and to adopt
a separate body of civil practice rules for the regulation of procedure
in the courts of record of the state. Thereafter, the proposed consti-
tution provided, from time to time at intervals of not less than five
years, the legislature was to appoint a commission to consider and
report what changes, if any, there should be in the law and rules
governing civil procedure. It further provided as follows:
"The legislature shall act on the report of each such commission by
a single bill, and the legislature shall not otherwise, or at any other time,
enact any law prescribing, regulating or changing the civil procedure
in the Court of Appeals, Supreme Court, or County Court, unless the
judges or justices empowered to make and amend civil practice rules
shall certify that legislation is necessary. After the adoption of the
civil practice rules by the legislature . . . the power to alter and
amend such rules and to make, alter, and amend civil practice rules
shall vest and remain in the courts of the State . . ."
This constitution was not adopted by the people at the general elec-
tion in November, 1915, when it was submitted for their ratification.
The report of the Board of Statutory Consolidation was referred by
the Legislature of 1915 to a joint legislative committee, and has been
under consideration by it continuously since that year. In the mean-
time, and as the first result of the general agitation over the subject
of the reform of civil practice, very radical amendments were made
in the Code of Civil Procedure: many provisions of substantive law
which had found their way into its sections were removed by legisla-
tion and transferred to appropriate places in the general statutes, and
the provisions relating to particular courts were grouped under the
heads of those respective tribunals. One thing became very apparent
during the hearings and discussions over the proposed new legislation,
and that was that a very widespread sentiment among the lawyers of
the state was opposed to vesting in the judges the power to prescribe
rules of practice beyond the very limited scope left to them by the
existing code. As a final result of its consideration of the subject,
the joint legislative committee submitted a report to the Legislature
of 1919, which proceeded on a different theory from that recommended
by the Board of Statutory Consolidation. It proposed to continue the
Code of Civil Procedure, simplified and made more elastic in many of
its provisions, to separate entirely from it the provisions relating to
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special courts, such as the Surrogates' Courts, the Municipal Courts
and other courts of special jurisdiction, and by incorporating in the
code of civil procedure, which was to be called the Civil Practice Act,
provisions designed to make the practice less technical than it had
been, to meet the general demand of the bar for radical amendment.
The bill embodied in this report was passed by both houses of the
legislature at the session of 1920, and approved by Governor Smith on
May 24, 1920. It is still open to the fundamental objection which
attached to the Code of Civil Procedure, in that its provisions will
be subject to constant legislative tinkering. The Field Code of 1848
was a model of simplicity, so far as its provisions were concerned.
From the moment of its enactment, it encountered the persistent
hostility of a bench and bar which bad been educated under the com-
mon-law system, and the decisions made under it were constantly
overruled by legislative enactment, until the amendment and revi-
sion of the Code became an annual legislative exercise, and a vast
structure of statutory enactment was built up, year by year, like a
coral reef, partially submerged in a sea of ignorance of the history
of the provisions which constantly called for construction in the
courts, and provoked amendment by the legislature. It was to meet
this constant temptation to meddle with the rules of practice that the
provision above referred to in the Constitution of 1915 was inserted,
forbidding the legislature, except at five year intervals, to amend the
practice act, unless requested so to do by the board of judges. For
this reason, and because of its departure from the theory which had
been urged upon the legislature for twenty odd years past, much
opposition to the approval by the Governor of the new act has been
expressed in the State and local Bar Associations. But in view of
the obvious improvements which it makes in the existing Code of
Civil Procedure, and the apparent impossibility of securing the enact-
ment of what may be called the ideal plan above referred to, both
the State and local Bar Associations united in requesting the Governor
to approve the bill.
The former Code of Civil Procedure was divided into twenty-three
chapters, composed of 3,383 sections. The new Civil Practice Act
eliminates from the practice code and distributes to special codes relat-
ing to Surrogates' Courts, Justices' Courts, etc., 752 sections, and by
combination and elimination reduces the whole number -of sections
in the Practice Act to 1,536, distributed among 89 articles. It would
be impracticable, within the limits of this COMMENT, to attempt a
review of the changes in procedure introduced by this new act, but
attention may be called to a few which are of fundamental importance
and which must have the effect of greatly reducing the number of
interlocutory applications to courts and the number of appeals on
questions of mere procedure. Thus, by section 209, it is enacted that
all persons may be joined in one action as plaintiffs,
COMMENTS
"in whom any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same
transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly,
severally, or in the alternative, where if such persons brought separate
actions any common question of law or fact would arise; provided that
if upon an application of any party it shall appear that such joinder
may embarrass or delay the trial of the action, the court may order
separate trials, or make such other order as may be expedient, and
judgment may be given for such one or more of the plaintiffs as may
be found entitled to relief for the relief to which he or they may be
entitled."
Again, in section 212, it is provided that it shall not be necessary
that each defendant shall be interested as to all the relief prayed for,
or as to every cause of action included in any proceeding against him;
but the court may make such order as may appear just to prevent any
defendant from being embarrassed or put to expense by being required
to attend any proceedings in which he may have no interest.
By section 213, where the plaintiff is in doubt as to the person from
whom he is entitled to redress, he may join two or more defendants,
to the intent that the question as to which, if any, of the defendants
is liable, and to what extent, may be determined as between the parties.
The chapter relating to pleading provides that
"the defendant or plaintiff, as the case may be, shall raise by his
pleading all matters which show the action or counterclaim not to be
maintainable, or that the transaction is either void or voidable in point
of law, and all such grounds of defense or reply, as the case may be,
which, if not raised, would be likely to take the opposite party by sur-
prise, or would raise issues of fact not arising out of the preceding
pleadings, as, for instance, fraud, statute of limitations, release, pay-
ment, facts showing an illegality either by statute, common law or
statute of frauds. The application of this section shall not be confined
to the instances enumerated."
Most liberal provisions are made for dealing with mistakes or irregu-
larities. Section 105 provides that
"at any stage of any action, special proceedings or appeal a mistake,
omission, irregularity or defect may be corrected or supplied, as the
case may be, in the discretion of the court, with or without terms, or,
if a substantial right of any party shall not be thereby prejudiced, such
mistake, omission, irregularity or defect must be disregarded."
No action or special proceeding shall be allowed to fail or be dis-
missed on the ground of a mistake in the court in which it is brought,
but in such case it shall be removed to the proper court, and subsequent
proceedings therein shall be the same as if it had been originally there
instituted.
It is further provided by section iii, that
"whenever in any action or special proceeding it shall appear at any
stage of the proceedings, or upon appeal, that the appropriate remedy
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upon the facts pleaded or alleged, or proved, is different from that
asked for in the pleadings or corresponding papers, the proceedings
may be amended upon such terms as may be just, if jurisdiction exists
to grant the proper remedy, and may be continued and determined by
the court, and at the term where then pending, or remitted, to the proper
term or court to be disposed of, in order that the relief may be finally
granted which is appropriate to the facts, to the same extent as if the
application had been in the first instance for the relief granted. The
court may correct by amendment all defects and irregularities in
matters of form or procedure and may bring in all parties necessary
to completely determine the matter and award the appropriate relief
upon the facts established."
Many other provisions are to be found through the act tending to
prevent mere technicalities from defeating the course of justice, and
requiring adequate notice to be given of applications for relief to
protect the interests of clients from destruction or injury by mere
slips in practice, and greatly simplifying the method of bringing
controversies into court for appropriate adjudication upon the merits.
Any objection to a pleading is required to be distinctly specified in the
answering pleading, or in a notice of motion based on the pleading,
specifically pointing out the particular defect relied upon. Demurrers
are abolished, and objections to pleadings in point of law for grounds
appearing on the face of the pleading, and the court rules may define
what objections may be taken by motion only. The right is given
to every party to an action to take the deposition of himself or his
adversary before trial, as well as the testimony of the assignor of a
claim which constitutes the cause of action in suit. A new provision1
is inserted empowering the Supreme Court in any action or proceeding
"to declare rights and other legal relations on request for such declara-
tion, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed, and such
declaration shall have the force of a final judgment. ' 2
The rules of court are to make such provisions as shall be necessary
and proper to carry the provisions of this section into effect. Judg-
ment may be rendered by the court in favor of any party or parties
and against any party or parties at any stage of the action or appeal,
if warranted by the pleadings or the admissions of a party or parties,
and a judgment may be rendered by the court as to a part of a cause
of action and the action proceed as to the remaining issues, as justice
may require. A non-suit or dismissal of a complaint or counterclaim
at the close of the plaintiff's or the defendant's evidence, as the case
may be, or a dismissal of a complaint or counterclaim at the close of
the whole evidence, is declared to be a final determination of the merits
of the action, and to bar a new action between the same parties, or their
'Section 473.
'See COMMENT (1920) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL. 545; and (1918) 28 ibid., 1,io5.
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privies for the same cause of action, unless the court shall dismiss with-
out prejudice.
All of these provisions are in line with the most enlightened and
advanced views of simplification of practice in courts. Some of the
provisions are taken from the English practice acts; others are in-
spired by the provisions of the revised United States Equity Rules,
and all of them tend to require rules of practice, whether promulgated
by the legislature or the courts, to be treated as mere procedural
regulations, and not as statutory provisions conferring substantive
rights. If these provisions shall be liberally interpreted and applied
by the courts to carry out the beneficent purpose of their enactment,
and the legislature shall refrain from constant amendment until time
and experience shall have afforded an opportunity to test their ade-
quacy, a very considerable advance will have been made towards the
attainment of as simple a method of civil protedure as the complex
nature of our social organization permits.
GEORGE W. WICKERSHAM.
THE OHIO COURT AND THE mores
Stare decisis. The Supreme Court of Ohio is hitting heads as it
sees them. This is indicated by readiness to overrule decisions of long
standing and by free and vigorous dissent. The doctrine of stare
decisis has often been silently honored in the breach, and it is inter-
esting to observe a court openly and consciously moulding the state-
ments of the law to suit the prevailing mores of the time. "A decided
case is worth as much as it weighs in reason and righteousness, and
no more. It is not enough to say 'thus saith the court.'" Thus saith
the court in Adams Express Company v. Beckwith (1919, Ohio)
126 N. E. 300.1 The suit was against one of several tort-feasors.
The plaintiff had previously received a sum of money from another
of the joint tort-feasors and had given to that one a written agree-
ment never to sue him, expressly reserving all rights against the
present defendant. The court very properly construed this agreement
in accord with the evident intention of the parties and held that it
did not operate as a release of the defendant. At the same time it
expressly overruled a case2 that it conceded "has been the law of Ohio
since 1825." Even had the document been under seal and contained
1 See to the same effect Kintz v. Harriger (1919, Ohio) 124 N. E. 168, quoted
in (1919) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, io6. Some courts will reverse themselves
in the same case on a later appeal. See Johnson v. Cadillac Motor Car Co.
(192o, C. C. A. 2d) 261 Fed. 878, reversing (1915) 221 Fed. 8oi, (192o) 29
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 568.
'Ellis v. Bitrer (1825) 2 Ohio, 89, 15 Am. Dec. 534. And see in accord Ruble
v. Turner (i8O8, Va.) 2 Hen. & M. 38.
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express words of release instead of an agreement not to sue, it should
not operate to release other tort-feasors in case it clearly evidences
that there has been no complete satisfaction. Joint tort-feasors are
severally as well as jointly liable; it is not necessary to join them all
as defendants as in the case of joint contractors, where a definite
release would prevent a necessary joinder of defendants. Even in
the case of joint contracts, words of positive release as to one, if
accompanied by a reservation of rights against others, will be construed
as a mere covenant not to sue.3  A fortiori it should be so held in the
case of joint torts.4 It has even been held that a release of one joint
tort-feasor does not release the others if the amount received is agreed
upon as only partial compensation. 5 When the others are sued they
can only require that the judgment rendered should be for the total
damage diminished by the amount received from the other wrong-
doers. In the recent case of Cormier v. Worcester Ry. (1919, Mass.)
125 N. E. 549, the court held that a release without reservation, given
for a nominal sum, released all of the wrong-doers, even though the
harm was caused unintentionally by the negligence of several acting
independently, and even though the one expressly released "was not
in fact responsible for the injury, if something in the nature of a claim
has been made upon him and there was a possible liability under the
rules of law." Surely, such a rule as this operates with unnecessary
injustice.
The Ohio court adds the suggestion that there should always be
'Price v. Barker (1855, Q. B.) 4 El. & BI. 760.
' (1918) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 90; Carey v. Bilby (1904, C. C. A. 8th) 129
Fed. 2o3; Dwy v. Connecticut Co. (915) 89 Conn. 74, 92 Atl. 883. COmMENT
(1915) 24 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 505. In a concurring opinion in the latter case,
Wheeler, J., preferred not to do justice by artificially construing definite words
of release into a covenant not to sue. He preferred to say directly that the
release of one does not release all unless there is full satisfaction agreed upon
and received. His opinion deserves quoting: "That court best serves the law
which recognizes that the rules of law which grew up in a remote generation may,
in the fulness of experience, be found to serve another generation badly, and
which discards the old rule when it finds that another rule of law represents
what should be according to the established and settled judgment of society
[the nores], and no considerable property rights have become vested in reliance
upon the old rule. It is thus great writers upon the common law have dis-
covered the source and method of its growth, and in its growth found its health
and life. It is not and should not be stationary. Change of this character
should not be left to the legislature." See further on this line Swayze, Tile
Growing Law (I915) 25 YALE LAW JOURNAL, I; Young, The Law as an
Expression of Community Ideals (1917) 27 ibid., I; The Dead Hand of the
Common Law (i918) 27 ibid., 686; Corbin, The Law and the Jfudges (1914)
3 YALE REViEW (N. S.) 234.
'Louisville etc. Co. v. Barnes (19o4) 117 Ky. 86o, 79 S. W. 261. There need
be no express reservation of rights where there is only a covenant not to sue
the one wrong-doer and no express words of release. Matheson v. O'Kane
(1912) 211 Mass. 91, 97 N. E. 638.
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a right of contribution among joint tort-feasors, and says that "Some
day the court will reverse" the present policy. It is certain that the
courts have long been busy in creating exceptions and limitations
upon the rule laid down in Merryweather v. Nixan.
6
The king can do io wrong. The Ohio court, in Fowler v. City of
Cleveland (1919) 126 N. E. 72, overruled another of its comparatively
recent decisions,7 and holds that a city must pay damages to one who
was run down by a hose truck negligently driven by a fireman. This
decision is not only contrary to the previous rule in Ohio but is opposed
to almost unanimous authority elsewhere.s The admiralty rule seems
to be in harmony with it.0 The majority opinion of Johnson, J., ably
discusses the distinction between the functions of a municipality
described as "governmental" and those described as "ministerial or
proprietary." He admits that the distinction is difficult to apply, that
governmental functions form "a vague and uncertain sphere," and
says that "much of the difficulty is because of the persistence of
antiquated and outworn terminology." Since municipal government
has greatly changed its character ("a modern city may be said to be
a great public service corporation"), he has no hesitation in moulding
the judge-made law to suit the new conditions, just as our judicial
leaders, great and small, have always done. Nevertheless, he retains
the distinction between the two functions, and merely holds that
although in deciding whether it should have a fire department the city's
action is governmental, its action and that of its servants in driving
a hose truck is ministerial. The fireman has "no part in the decision
or determination of the sovereign will."
To the average reader the majority opinion-would appear to be
sound and progressive; but it is not progressive enough for Wana-
maker, J. "I heartily agree with the majority in the soundness of this
judgment. I as heartily disagree upon the grounds of the judgment."
The majority opinion whittles down the sphere of the governmental
function to the aggrandizement of the ministerial. Judge Wanamaker
(I799, K. B.) 8 T. R. 186; see 12 HARV. L. REv. 176.
7Frederick v. City of Columbus (898) 58 Oh. St. 538, 5I N. E. 35.
'Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5th ed. 1911) sec. 166o; McQuillin,
Municipal Corporations (1913) sec. 2432; JTewett v. New Haven (871) 38 Conn.
368, 9 Am. Rep. 382 (two judges dissenting); and cases cited by Gray, J.,
dissenting in Workman v. New York, infra.
'In Workman v. New York"(Igoo) 179 U. S. 552, 21 Sup. Ct. 212 (reversing
14 C. C. A. 53o, 67 Fed. 347) the Supreme Court held that the city of New
York was' bound to pay damages to the owner of a boat that was negligently
rammed by a fire-boat belonging to the city. The court recognized that the
common-law decisions were otherwise (indicating some doubt as to their sound-
ness), but held that in admiralty law the distinction between governmental
and ministerial functions of municipalities was not recognized. Gray, Brewer,
Shiras, and Peckham, JJ., dissenting.
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would annihilate the ministerial function altogether, and then hold the
municipality bound to pay for injuries caused in the exercise of its
police powers and governmental functions. This he would do in
the vindication of individualistic democracy, of the Ohio Bill of
Rights declaring that for every wrong there shall be a remedy, and
-of the "self-evident" truths in the Declaration of Independence, and
to the confusion of Autocrats and Bolsheviki. To him the immunity
-of a city in the exercise of a governmental function is part and parcel
of the immunity of a sovereign state, a doctrine "based upon the
assumption of the divine right of kings-a king can do no wrong."
"This doctrine has be n shot to death on so many different battlefields
that it would seem utter folly now to resurrect it."
Kings have been shot to death and a Lord Chancellor has been
'hanged; but the "doctrine" still lives. "L'etat, c'est moi," said
Louis XIV; and as long as that was true the king could do no legal
*wrong, but no longer. We do indeed appeal to "natural justice"; not
justice in- some imaginary state of nature, but the prevailing mores
of to-day, the settled convictions of the community as to what makes
for general welfare. Upon these most of our rules of law are based,
-and to them the judges must look for justification of the rules they
make. But, nevertheless, legal rights and duties exist only when
there is compulsion by organized social power. One does not compel
'himself, though he may will to act; and the possessors of the ultimate
social power have no legal duties. If the people of the United States
-are adjudged by a court to owe an individual a sum of money, pay-
ment by them nevertheless remains a voluntary act. 10 There is no
'legal right or duty, because there is no one to compel.
A municipal corporation (or the people thereof), however, is not
the king or the state. No one denies that the state officers can do
-wrong, or that some specified number of persons can do wrong. As
to them, even though they wield a limited social power, there can be
-compulsion by an external and superior organized power. It becomes,
therefore, a mere matter of policy as to whether we shall declare that
a city must pay damages for negligent injury by a fireman. The state
-and the nation can compel it if we wish it to be the law. The shadowy
distinction between governmental and ministerial functions may help
-us in determining policy, but it is not conclusive. Surely Judge ""ana-
-maker would not make the city pay damages for all injuries-say, for
example, for the loss of a house by fire because the city council from
mistaken motives of economy decided to have no fire department."
Jones, J., dissents squarely from the decision because he believes
the law should be as it has been. He appeals in the traditional way to
"0See The Siren (1869, U. S.) 7 Wall. 153; 'The Athol (1842) I Win. Rob.
.374; The Parlenient Beige (1879) 4 P. D. 129.
" Wheeler v. Cincinnati (1869) ig Oh. St. ig.
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the wise judges of the past. It is possible that he is right. It is not
every radical or liberal innovator who knows the settled convictions
of his community and adopts a sound policy.
Powers of courts in the absence of precedent. If a court can make
new law in the teeth of a long line of precedents, relying for support
upon what it believes to be the existing convictions of the community
(which may be invoked under such names as "natural justice" or
the mores), how much easier is it to make new law in the absence of
all precedent! "Is precedent indispensable? Who furnished the
precedent for the precedent?" Echo answers, Who? Where
precedent exists, it is not lightly to be cast aside. What is better evi-
dence of the settled conviction of the community than the generally
accepted judicial precedents, established by selected judges after
strenuous argument by two adversely interested parties and their
counsel? These precedents are better evidence than the mere intui-
tion or inner consciousness of an over-confident and self-sufficient
pamphleteer. Nevertheless, our courts can and often must change
the law in spite of precedent and blaze the way with new precedents
where none exists. We ask only that the job be well done.
By a Cold Storage Act12 the Ohio Legislature has forbidden the
storage of whole carcasses of pork, and other foods, for more than
six months, and provided that in case of such long storage it should
be unlawful for the owner thereafter to offer such pork for sale.
By a separate law, known as the Anti-Trust Act, 3 combinations of
two or more persons to restrict trade, raise prices, or prevent competi-
tion have been declared illegal and punishable by civil damages and
by fine and imprisonment. In Columbus Packing Company v. State
(1919) 126 N. E. 291, it appeared that the Packing Company had
stored 15o,ooo pounds of pork with a warehouse company for more
than six months, and that the lower court, by virtue of its equity
jurisdiction, had granted an injunction against sale of the pork by
the owner and had appointed a receiver with direction to sell the
pork in the market. This decree is now sustained by the Supreme
Court on the theory that the purpose of the storage for more than
six months was to restrict trade, prevent competition, and raise prices,
and that the storage company and the packing company had thus
violated both the Cold Storage Act and the Anti-Trust Act. That
neither statute provides that the court may appoint a receiver and
order the goods sold troubles the court not at all. The first law
makes it illegal for the owner to sell, the second law gave the court
general equity jurisdiction in case of restraint of trade, and the exist-
'Act of March 21, 1917 (io 7 Ohio Laws, 1917, 594).
"Valentine Anti-Trust Law, Gen. Code, 191o, secs. 639o-64o2.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
ing food shortage "the most appalling in all recorded time" does
the rest.
What though the statutes in question provide certain specific
remedies and say nothing of sale by a receiver! "Unprecedented
conduct [query whether it was?] necessarily calls for new remedies.
The authority to prescribe the remedy is vested in the courts by the
grant of equitable powers. Equity, to maintain the purpose of its
establishment, must continue to enlarge its field of action." We
believe that the court is on safe ground. The two corporations
involved may shout "usurpation" and "Government by injunction."
at last finding comfort in the late arguments of our perennial Candi-
date; but those arguments did not prevail, and when made in the
present case will poll few votes. No doubt in granting the specific
remedy here involved the court must act under the cloak of "Equity";
but let us observe that the common law as well as equity has growth
and change, and that the power to lay down new rules has never been
restricted to the Chancellor.
Robinson, J., dissents, one reason being that a righteous end "does
not justify an invasion of the legislative field by the judiciary." But,
as we have observed, the court is not invading a new field; it is merely
making hay in the accustomed meadow, though perhaps rushing the
harvest with unwonted vigor and despatch. Inasmuch as the answer
specifically denied any combination in restraint of trade, Judge
Robinson thinks the defendant entitled to a hearing on this issue. The
majority believe that the answer contained admissions sufficient to
justify the court in finding as a fact that such a combination existed.
The lower court's equity jurisdiction depended wholly on this finding,
and its accuracy in fact is not as obvious as would be desirable.
There seems to have been no real "confiscation" of property here.
With accurate analysis, the court observes that the statute has already
deprived the owner of its "privilege . . . of selling," one of the
"valuable insignia of ownership." The court's decree robs it of
another of these "insignia," the privilege of not selling and of letting
the goods rot. This privilege also is a component part of ownership,
and it is of value; but its judicial destruction need not worry us, in
view of the fact that the proceeds of the forced sale are to go to the
Packing Company.
Beneficiaries of contractors' bonds. It has gradually become clear
that third-party beneficiaries of a contract made by two others have
legally enforceable rights.14  In this field, as in the law of assign-
ment, "privity" of contract has nearly ceased to be a fetish. The
question "who is a beneficiary" must now continually be faced. In
14See Anson, Contract (3d Am. ed. by Corbin, 1919) ch. IX; i Williston,
Contracts (1920) ch1. XIII.
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two recent cases, Royal Indemnity Co. v. Northern Ohio G. & S. Co.
(1919, Ohio) 126 N. E. 405, and State v. Watts (1919, Ohio) 126
N. E. 407, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that where a contractor's
surety bond is expressly conditioned on payment by the contractor
of all laborers or naterialmen, these latter can maintain suit on the
bond against the surety. 1 The promise of the surety is made to the
owner of the building or other employer of the contractor, not to the
laborers or material men. Are these latter intended as beneficiaries?
This question cannot be answered dogmatically and uniformly for all
cases. It depends largely upon the express words of the surety bond,"
G
and these vary with the particular case. The matter is often put
beyond doubt in the case of work done on public contracts by statutes
expressly requiring a bond to protect laborers and material men."-
The bond may be so worded as clearly to be solely. for the protection
of the owner against liens; the fact that the bond is conditioned on
payment of claims is not conclusive as to this.
Even though the intention to create a right in the third party is
very clear, the court should be careful not to deprive the promisee
(the owner or employer) of his protection by exhausting the penalty
of the bond in behalf of laborers and material men. The third party
is not the sole beneficiary, since the bond is given chiefly to protect
the promisee himself. For this reason it was held in Fosmire v.
National Surety Company'5 (May, 1920, N. Y. Ct. App.), not yet
officially reported, that a laborer cannot maintain suit on a highway
contractor's bond to the state conditioned on performance of the work
and also on payment of laborers. The court expressly reserves the
question whether the state as promisee might not maintain suit on
the bond for the benefit of the unpaid laborers. It seems clear that
such a suit should lie; and if so, it is likewise clear that the laborers
are intended beneficiaries with rights not the less enforceable because
they are subsidiary to those of the promisee, the only question being
as to the form of the remedy. This is made the more apparent by
section 1915 of the New York Code, which provides that the condition
of a bond is to be construed as a promise to perform the act consti-
tuting the condition, thus showing that the Surety Company promised
the state to pay the laborers. They should certainly have the usual
" The court very briefly disposes of, and in effect overrules, the recent case
of Cleveland Metal R. & C. Co. v. Gaspard (1914) 89 Oh. St. 185, io6 N. E. 9,
reprinted with extensive annotations in L. R. A. I915A 768, Ann. Cas. I9i6A 745.
"0 In Morganton Mfg. & T. Co. v. Anderson (1914) 165 N. C. 285, 81 S. E.
418, the bond provided that "The surety shall not be liable under this bond to
any one except the owner."
' See Equitable Surety Co. v. McMillan (1913) 234 U. S. 448, 34 Sup. Ct.
8o3; Puget Sound S. Bank v. Gallucci (914) 82 Wash. 445, 144 Pac. 698;
Carpenter v. Furrey (igoO) 128 Calif. 665, 61 Pac. 369; Bay State Co. v. Ellis
(1920, Mass.) 126 N. E. 468.
"Reversing (1919) 189 App. Div. 44, 177 N. Y. Supp. 8io.
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remedies of a cestui que trust. In a suit broughtin their own names,
the interests of the promisee can be protected by making him a party,
and doubtless this should be required. It should be remembered that
the penalty may be ample to cover the losses of all beneficiaries and
that the state can withhold instalments from the contractor if he fails
to pay his laborers. The fact that the state is the chief beneficiary
and that the penalty is an entire sum does not show that the parties
intended the laborers to have no enforceable rights, but only that such
rights should be conditional upon the receipt of full satisfaction by
the state. In the greater number of cases the third party's action
on the bond has been held maintainable.
19
Taxation of a stock exchange seat. "Is the membership in the New
York Stock Exchange property? If so, is the situs of the property at
the domicil of the owner?" With these questions the court opens its
per curiam opinion in Anderson v. Durr (1919, Ohio) 126 N. E. 57.
The suit was brought by Anderson to enjoin the listing of the seat
for taxation and the collection of a tax thereon, in the state of Ohio
where Anderson was domiciled. The Ohio statute, Gen. Code, 191o,
sec. 5328; provides that "All real or personal property in this
state . . . and all moneys, credits, investments in bonds, stocks, or
otherwise, of persons residing in this state, shall be subject to taxa-
tion." It was held that the plaintiff was taxable in Ohio and the
injunction was refused.
Membership in the stock exchange is undoubtedly property and is
clearly taxable somewhere. By "property" we do not mean some
physical res, although the term is popularly used in that sense.
Instead, we mean a group of legal relations with which a so-called
owner is invested by the law, and a tax is a price that he must pay
to organized society for being so invested. This group is a shifting
and changeable group, and there may or may not be a physical res
with respect to which the owner's legal relations with his fellow men
exist.2 0 For the existence of "property," therefore, no res is necessary
and no particular combination of legal relations is necessary.
Has the exchange member a privilege or a right? He has many of
each. He is privileged to do acts on the exchange, or to have his agents
do them, that others are not privileged to do. He has rights against
"'Forburger S. Co. v. Lion B. & S. Co. (igig, Neb.) 17o N. W. 897, with
COMMENT (IgIg) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 798; Ochs v. Carnahan Co. (19o8)
42 Ind. App. 157, 8o N. E. 163; Hay v. Hassett (1916) 174 Iowa, 6oi, 156
N. W. 734. Contra: Standard Gas P. Co. v. New England Casualty Co. (1917)
go N. J. L. 570, ioi At. 281, (1917) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 274; Eureka
Stone Co. v. Ft. Smith Church (igo8) 86 Ark. 212, iO S. W. lO42. See
further, Ann. (as. I9x6A, 754; I Williston, op. cit., sec. 372.
"See Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Rea-
soning (1917) 26 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 710; COMMENT (1917) ibid., 779.
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all persons not to be interfered with in the exercise of his privileges.
Thus his own action is, with respect to other persons, privileged or
free; while the action of other persons, with respect to him, is not
privileged or free. Further, he has powers to affect the legal rela-
tions of others that non-members have not; and many of his rights,
powers, and privileges are protected by immunities.21 It is of these
legal relations that all property consists. In the present instance, we
can even find a res with respect to which they operate. The stock
exchange building is a res. Many of the member's legal relations
affect the enjoyment of that building, although they are not such as
to induce us to describe him as an owner of the building.
The courts have very generally agreed that the membership is prop-
erty, but some have held for various reasons that it is not taxable. 21
It is well established, however, that a membership passes to the
trustee in bankruptcy as being included within "Property which .
he could by any means have transferred" ;23 and it is subject to inherit-
ance taxation.2 4  Our highest authority has held that it is subject
" See Corbin, Legal Analysis and Terminology (igig) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
163.
"People v. Feitner (igoi) 167 N. Y. i, 6o N. E. 265, held that it was not
included within a statute taxing capital of non-residents invested in business
in New York. "The money that he has paid for his membership or seat is for
the mere facility to transact his particular business and to surround it with
such safeguards of rectitude and honorable dealing as tend to promote both
rapidity and safety." But it is for this very "facility" and these very "safe-
guards" that all property relations are created by the law. In Baltimore v.
4Johnson (19o3) 96 Md. 737, 54 Atl. 646, the tax law provided that "all other
property of every kind, nature, or description within this state . . . shall
be valued and assessed." No attempt had been made for more than fifty years
to apply this to seats on exchange, and the court thought this sufficiently showed
that the legislature had not intended to include them. The court admitted that
"by the great weight of authority, it cannot be said to be merely a personal
privilege, but must be regarded as property, although in a limited and qualified
sense." This is accurate; but later the court says: "it lacks one of the most
valuable and usual characteristics of property,-the right of disposing of it
as the owner deems proper." But this "right" (more properly called a power)
actually exists. See note 23, infra. San Francisco v. Anderson (1894) 1O3 Calif.
69, 36 Pac. io34, held that a seat is not taxable. Although there are "rights"
and "privileges and advantages" of various sorts, "it is too impalpable to go
into any category of taxable property." This must be flatly disapproved.
"Page v. Edmunds (19o3) 187 U. S. 596, 23 Sup. Ct. 200. "The appellant
could have sold his membership, the purchaser taking it subject to election by
the exchange, and some other conditions." Property may exist in one whose
power of disposal is limited and conditional upon uncertain events. As
Finch, J., said in Powell v. Waldron (1882) 89 N. Y. 328, the membership is
property capable of transfer, although it is "clogged with conditions." See
also Sparhawk v. Yerkes (i8gi) 142 U. S. i, 12 Sup. Ct. 1O4.
"In re Glendinning (19o2) 68 App. Div. 125, 74 N. Y. Supp. 19o, affirmed
without opinion in 17i N. Y. 684, 64 N. E. 1121; In re Hellinan (19o3) 174
N. Y. 254, 66 N. E. 8og. These cases greatly limit the application of People v.
Feitner, supra.
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to ordinary taxation as personal property in the state where the
exchange is located.2" The present case now holds that it is subject
to taxation at the domicil of the owner, although he is domiciled in
a state distant from the exchange, and is included within a statute
merely declaring all property to be taxable.
26  In so holding, the
court applies the ordinary rule applicable to all 
intangible property.
2 7
This may involve double taxation, at the domicil and at the situs. Such
double taxation may be economically unsound, but the decisions do
not show it to be illegal."
5
It is easy to multiply proofs that our faulty legal terminology 
causes
much unnecessary litigation. What is meant by the term "liability"?
In First National Bank v. National Surety Co. (192o, N. Y. Ct. 
App.)
63 N. Y. L. J. 531, May 12, 1920, the defendant was sued on a bond
given to secure the plaintiff against loss by possible defalcations 
of an
employee. The bond provided that "Any claim . . . must 
be duly
presented to the surety within six months after the date of the 
ter-
mination of the surety's liability hereunder for any reason." The
"insured period" ended in 1914, by reason of non-payment 
of pre-
miums for any longer period. That the employee had embezzled
money in 1913 was first discovered on December 28, 1915, and 
a claim
was presented to the defendant on May IO, 1916. The defendant
contended that the claim was made too late, and the court so 
held,
the "liability" involved having ended with the insured period. 
The
plaintiff argued that the term "liability" meant "the 
obligation of
the defendant," and it must be admitted that one of the common 
uses
of the term is in the sense of debt or duty. The court said that the
word here meant "the condition of being exposed to the upspringing
'Rogers v. Hennepin Co. (1916) 240 U. S. 184, 36 Sup. Ct. 265, holding 
that
a nbn-resident may be taxed in the state where the exchange 
is located because
the "rights and privileges" are to be exercised there. It 
was held also that
there is no double taxation, even though the property of 
the exchange itself
is separately taxed. To the same effect is State v. Minnesota 
Tax Comm.
(1917) 136 Minn. 26o, 161 N. W. 516.
"This is supported by State v. McP hail (1914) 124 Minn. 398, 145 N. 
W. io8,
5o L. R. A. (N. S.) 255.
"Fidelity & C. T. Co. v. Louisville (1917) 245 U. S. 54, 38 Sup. Ct. 
40.
Tangible personal property, even though movable, cannot be taxed 
at the
domicil of the owner if it has a "permanent" location in another state. Union
Transit Co. v. Kentucky (905) 199 U. S. 194, 26 Sup. Ct. 36. But if it has 
no
such permanent location it is taxable only at the domicil. Hays v. Pacific 
M.
S. Co. (1854, U. S.) 17 How. 596. The question of "permanency" may 
fre-
quently be hard to determine.
" Thus bank deposits are taxable in both places. Fidelity & C. T. Co. 
v.
Louisville, supra; Blackstone v. Miller (1903) 188 U. S. 189, 23 Sup. Ct. 277.
See, in general, Beale, Jurisdiction to Tax (1919) 32 HARV. L. REv. 587; Beale,
The Situs of Things (Igg) 28 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 525.
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of an obligation to make good an undertaking of another or a loss
or deficit."
Upon delivery of the bond, legal relations were created. The surety
as yet owed no instant duty to the plaintiff, but if two subsequent
events (defalcation, and claim within six months from some date)
should occur, the surety would be under an instant duty the breach of
which would be a "cause of action." Prior to these two events, we
say that the plaintiff had a conditional right and the defendant a
conditional duty.23 Further, the defendant was under a disability to
escape from this duty. He had no power of revocation (except one
expressly reserved to be exercised by a thirty day notice). One of
the two events operative as conditions precedent was defalcation, a
voluntary act of the employee; and if we follow Hohfeld's analysis,30
the employee had a power over the defendant and the latter had a
correlative liability with respect to the employee. The other event
operative as a condition was notice of defalcation within a certain
time, a voluntary act by the plaintiff; so that as between plaintiff and
defendant also there would exist a power and a liability. It is the
first of these two liabilities to which the contract referred, as the
court correctly holds. Since the employee's voluntary act of defalca-
tion will per se bring the defendant into new legal relations with the
plaintiff (as well as with the employee also), the defendant is under a
liability to the creation of these relations without his own knowledge
or consent. As the court says, he is "exposed to the upspringing of
an obligation to make good" the loss. But this liability ended with
the termination of the "insured period" in 1914, for the power of
the employee ended then. By the express terms of the contract, the
power of the plaintiff, to be exercised.by giving notice, ended six
months later, and thereafter the surety owed no duty of any kind
and was under no further liability to the creation of such a duty.
Hohfeld's analysis has been criticised as an attempt to force a
peculiar terminology upon unwilling victims; but one of its chief
merits is that the meaning he ascribed to each term is one of the
meanings most commonly found in actual "judicial reasoning."
The effect of Tremont Trust Co. v. Barack (1920, Mass.) 126 N. E.
782, can be shortly summed up: people who sign papers without read-
ing them are likely to be sorry; and a bank has not yet become a
public service corporation. A depositor seeking to stop payment on
a check was presented a card to sign, and signed it. In substance the
card provided that while the bank was to use its best efforts to stop
"Anson, Contract (3d Am. ed. by Corbin, igig) secs. 353-365.
'Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning
(1913) 23 YALE LAv JOURNAL, i6; Corbin, Legal Analysis and Terminology
(I919) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 163.
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the payment, yet if payment occurred through inadvertence, it was to
extinguish the bank's debt to its depositor pro tanto. The bank pro-
ceeded to pay the check, negligently. It was held that an instruction
that "the law does not recognize the right of the bank to contract
against its own negligence" was properly excepted to. But just
what consideration there was for that contract does not appear.
Newspapers, too, have been sought to be "impressed with a public
character"-do they not sometimes maintain an important department
offering advice to the lovelorn? It was reasoned in Reeda v. The
Tribune Co. (1920, Ill. App.) 52 Chi. Leg. News 306 (Apr. 22,
192o) that having entered upon the operation of such departments,
the paper was "bound to maintain them." The plaintiff was suing
the defendant for damages incurred through the defendant's pub-
lishing what purported to be a facsimile copy of the specimen ballot,
on which the plaintiff's candidacy for a judgeship was nowhere indi-
cated. In very soundly holding dismissal of the complaint proper
the court notes sagely that the mobile vulgus of yore is still fickle in
its interest. A newspaper may therefore change departments and
policies at pleasure; more: it owes "no duty either to the plaintiff
or to the public to publish anything which for any reason it did not
see fit to publish." Is this wholly sound?
Delano v. Equitable Trust Co. (192o, Sup. Ct.) iio N. Y. Misc.
704, deals with another aspect of the banker-depositor relation. 
It
was there held that a bank holding matured notes of the depositor was
privileged to set off the notes against the deposit and dishonor checks
drawn against the amount so set off, without giving any notice to the
depositor. The rule strikes one as too broad. Notes are currently
made payable at a bank, and thus become orders on the bank to pay
them; and a depositor normally knows what claims his bank holds
against him, and can fairly be required to figure his own balance.
But it would seem that in laying down a broad rule one should leave
one exception: when an outstanding note is bought by a bank at
which it is not payable without the knowledge of the maker, it seems
hardly sound to allow set-off and dishonor of checks without notice to
the depositor.
When an impostor personally obtained delivery of a negotiable
instrument made out to him under his assumed name, it was settled
at common law that his endorsement was good to give a good claim
to a holder in due course. Tolman v. American National Bank (19O1)
22 R. I. 462, 48 Atl. 480 took the astounding ground that this had
been changed by the provision in N. I. L. sec. 23 that a forged signa-
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ture is inoperative. Great as is the desirability of uniformity in inter-
preting the N. I. L., we must welcome the decision in Montgomery
Garage Co. v. Manufacturers' Ins. Co. (192o, N. J. Ct. Err.) 1O9
Ati. 296, where (intentionally or unintentionally) the Tolnan case is
wholly overlooked, and the sound common-law rule applied. For, says
the court, though the payee's signature be a forgery, yet it is such a
forgery as, again under sec. 23, the maker is precluded from setting up.
The doctrine of Price v. Neal has been susta ined again, in one of
its most interesting forms. A forger drew a draft in X's name, to
X's order, endorsed it with X's name, and cashed it with a bona fide
purchaser. The drawee paid it; his later suit to recover the money
paid was denied in United States v. Chase National Bank (Apr. 19,
1920) U. S. Sup. Ct. Oct. Term 1919, No. 134. The Court distin-
guished the case from those on forged endorsements generally on the
ground that here nobody had better right to the instrument than the
collecting bank. The decision is sound. However one works the case
out, through fictitious payee, or through the forger as made payee
under a name not his own, the bona fide purchaser seems to have
acquired title to the paper and the apparent, obligation. It may be
noted that the Court's reasoning would apply equally if another name
than the apparent drawer's had been inserted and endorsed as the
payee's.
Like most dialectitians or prestidigitators, a court will ordinarily
succeed in extracting from a high hat or a major premise every rabbit
it has first put in. Fortunately most courts show good horse sense in
the selection of the rabbit before its insertion in the hat; but that
does not make the process of apparent deduction more convincing.
Lawler v. Dunn (1920, Minn.) 176 N. W. 989-decided, anyhow, on
All Fools' Day-points the argument. An attorney, discharged in
breach of contract, sued for damages and was denied recovery. The
court-first established "the right of a client to discharge his attorney
at his election with or without cause." Then "if the client has this
right . . . it follows as a natural consequence that he cannot be
compelled to pay damages for exercising that right." The case fol-
lows Martin v. Camp (1916) 219 N. Y. 170, 114 N. E. 46, L. R. A.
I9 I7F 4o2; there the conclusion was reached "by necessary implica-
tion" from similar premises. Such reasoning is regrettable. If the
"right" of the client to terminate the relation means simply power, it
is no more than he has in any contract of employment, and the conclu-
sion is a non sequitur. If, on the other hand, the "right" to discharge
is made to mean power plus privilege of exercising the power (like the
"right" of an authorized agent to contract for his principal), we
simply have our rabbit back out of the hat. The real question behind
the mask of logical necessity is one purely of policy: should an
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attorney be limited to quantum meruit? If the "rule is well calculated
to promote public confidence in the members of an honorable profes-
sion," then the rule is sound; but its true soundness is to be tested
by the accuracy of that calculation, and not by dialectical evidences
that the hand is quicker than the eye.
Uden v. Schaeffer (192o, Wash.) 188 Pac. 395 presents the proposi-
tion that "strikes or labor difficulties" in an exception in a surety
bond does not include concerted quitting by workmen, without any
intention to return. There is only a "strike" when the workmen quit
in a body "for the purpose of coercing their employer to accede to
some demand they have made upon him." The application of the rule
to the facts of the case is perhaps open to question: the workmen-
union men-quit because required to do so by the union's agreement
with an employers' association from which their employer had been
suspended.
The Reed Amendment forbids carriage into any dry state of liquor
for personal consumption even in the owner's private automobile.
"The introduction could be effected only through transportation, and
whether this took one form or another it was transportation in inter-
state commerce." United States v. Simpson (Apr. 19, 192o) U. S.
Sup. Ct. Oct. Term 1919, No. 444. The decision is sound and proper:
with the growth of automobile transportation, and with the all-inclu-
siveness of the plea of personal use the statute would indeed "not be
of much practical benefit" if it were held otherwise.
Few things show more graphically the growth of law than the
extension of the courts' recognition and protection to interests for-
merly beyond the pale. A man's interest in enjoying his dogs,
31 in
having strangers refrain from interference with his city's water sup-
ply,32 in not having his picture displayed in the movies,
33 in the preser-
vation of his family's social position,3 4 in the use of an elevator he
is running in fact although in breach of legal duty,
3 5 ,in the preserva-
tion of his city beautiful from advertising signs-these indicate
healthy change, protection of interests either not financial or "finan-
cial" only because of the stretching of the term to give it new and
larger content. Dettmar v. Burns Bros. (I92O, App. Div.) 181 N. Y.
Supp. 146, allowing recovery of substantial damages for the injury of
an automobile used entirely for pleasure purposes, is another sound
step in the process of living growth. Our Lady the Law-well may
we rise to the old-time toast: vivat, crescat, floreat!
31 (1914) 24 YALE LAW JouRNAL, 170; (igig) 29 ibid., lo9.
I (igig) 28 ibid., 5o7.
"3Ibid., 269; cf, (192o) 29 ibid., 450; Feeney v. Young (192o, App. Div.) 18x
N. Y. Supp. 481. * (1920 29 ibid., 344. (1919) 28 ibid., 6q5.
